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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
__________________
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
EDDIE A. SALAZAR,
Defendant/Appellant.
Appellant is not incarcerated.
__________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
On July 6, 2015, Steve Young broke into Homeowner's house through the
back door and stole items including Homeowner's wife's medication. Salazar and
his wife met Young for the first time the day of the offense. They drove Young to
Homeowner's house. Salazar's defense at trial was that he and his wife did not
know Young intended to commit a burglary. After being stopped by police
because the car matched the description of a car possibly involved in the
burglary, Salazar and his wife recounted to law enforcement that at some point,
Young had exited the car, was gone a few minutes, and then got back into the car
with some items in his hands. They then drove away. Salazar told police that he
initially drove faster to avoid a car that appeared to be following them. But, once
that car disappeared, they stopped at a 7-Eleven for gas.

Mrs. Salazar was deceased at the time of the trial. The trial court admitted
her out-of-court statements to the detective over Salazar's objection. In those
statements Mrs. Salazar referred to Young as a friend to whom they had given a
ride. Among other things, she said that she had discarded a bag of pills at the 7Eleven that Young had stolen from Homeowner's house. This Court should
reverse and remand for a new trial because Mrs. Salazar's statements were
inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause and Utah Rules of Evidence
prohibiting hearsay.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue I: Whether the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of a
deceased witness's statement to police in violation of the Confrontation Clause.
Standard of Review: "Whether a defendant's confrontation rights have
been violated is a question of law, reviewed for correctness." State v. Garrido,
2013 UT App 245, ¶ 9, 314 P.3d 1014.
Preservation: This issue is preserved by trial counsel's objection and
argument in trial. R.440-46,485.
Issue II: Whether the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay evidence
under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Standard of Review: The standard of review on the admissibility of
hearsay "often contains a number of rulings, each of which may require a
different standard of review." State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, ¶ 10, 153
P.3d 830 (quoting State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 639 (internal
2

quotation omitted)). "Legal questions regarding admissibility are reviewed for
correctness, and questions of fact are reviewed for clear error." Id. The standard
of review on the trial court's admissibility ruling is abuse of discretion. Id.
Preservation: This issue is preserved by trial counsel's objection and
argument in trial. R.427,433-40.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State’s Case
On July 6, 2015, Homeowner's house was burgled while no one was home.
Homeowner received messages from his burglar alarm company and the
Cottonwood Heights Police saying that his house had been burgled. R.401-02.
When he came home that afternoon he found his house in disarray. R.402-06.
The basement door had been forced open. R.402-03,410-11, State's Exh. 7-8.
There were footprints on the stairs and a scuff mark on the home alarm. R.403.
Homeowner's sunglasses were missing, along with a money clip, money, his
wife's medications, some jewelry, and a microcassette recorder. R.403,405-06,
State's Exh. 3-6,9-11.
Homeowner testified that his home was on a hill. R.409. The basement was
accessible from the backyard. R.409-10. Because of the hill, no one in front of the
home, in the driveway, or in the street would have been able to see what went on
behind the house. R.410, State's Exh. 1-2. Homeowner did not know Salazar,
Salazar's wife, or Young. R.407. He had never seen Salazar before. R.408. Crime
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scene technicians went to Homeowner's house to collect evidence. R.461. There
was no evidence that Salazar ever entered the house. R.461.
A witness ("Witness") testified that on July 6, 2015 at around 1:00 p.m. he
was looking at homes in Cottonwood Heights. R.465. He saw a car driving slowly,
against the curb, maybe ten miles an hour, go around the area twice. R.46668,472-73. He had never seen the car or its occupants before. R.476. Witness
watched for about fifteen minutes. R.468,473. He never saw anyone get out of the
car. R.473. The car, a mid-90's Honda, was white with possibly a black car bra on
the hood. R.466. It had four doors. R.466. The driver had a shaved head, was a
Hispanic male, and had his seat tilted back. R.469. The front passenger was
female with dark hair. R.469. Another male, of European, Anglo Saxon descent,
trotted from between houses and the car sped up to meet him. R.470,473-74. The
second male jumped into the car and the car sped off. R.470,473-74. Witness
followed and called police. R.470. Witness thought the car sped up while he
followed, so he stopped following. R.471,474-75.
On July 6, 2015, Detective Damien Olson, on duty with the Cottonwood
Heights Police Department, was dispatched on a report of a residential burglary.
R.411,413-15. The report said to look for an older 90's, white Honda Accord with
a black leather bra and three occupants in the car, including possibly a Hispanic
male driver with a shaved head. R.415-16. Dispatch said that the vehicle was last
seen at Wasatch Boulevard and 9400 South. R.417.
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Det. Olson saw a vehicle at 9000 South 1300 East that he believed fit the
description of the vehicle he was looking for. R.417,452. The car he saw was a
1990 white Honda Accord with fading white paint and a black leather accessory
bra, registered to Salazar. R.417-18,452. Det. Olson, in his unmarked patrol
vehicle, did not notice any speeding or erratic or reckless driving. R.416,452,463.
He activated signals for the car to pull over. R.452-53. The car pulled into the
main parking lot at 7900 South 1300 East. R.418,453.
The car contained three occupants: a possibly Hispanic adult male, a
female passenger in the front seat, and an adult white male in the back seat.
R.419. Salazar was the driver. R.419-21. Mrs. Salazar sat in the front passenger
seat. R.420,449. Young was the backseat passenger. R.420. Salazar was at all
times cooperative and compliant. R.453,457. Witness came to the parking lot and
confirmed that the vehicle and the occupants were the same vehicle and
occupants that he had seen driving earlier. R.420.
Det. Olson read Miranda warnings to Young and the Salazars. R.421,449.
He read Salazar the Miranda warnings even though Salazar was not in custody or
in handcuffs. R.455. Salazar said that he understood his rights and agreed to
speak to the detective. Salazar told Det. Olson that he had given Young a ride.
R.456,423. Salazar said that, at one point, Young exited the car, was gone for a
few minutes, and then returned to the vehicle, carrying some items. R.423-24. As
they drove away, they observed another vehicle following or chasing them. R.425.
Salazar drove faster to lose the vehicle. R.425. They stopped for gas at a 7-Eleven.
5

R.425. Det. Olson asked Salazar if he knew what Young did at the home. R.426.
Salazar said he was unsure but assumed Young had stolen something. R.427. On
cross examination, Det. Olson said that he did not witness Salazar do anything
illegal. R.462.
Mrs. Salazar also agreed to speak to the detective. R.449. She told the
detective that she and Salazar drove Young, their friend, to an address on the east
side. R.449-51. She did not know the address because she had been distracted by
her cell phone. R.449. They then went to a 7-Eleven store. R.449-50. Young gave
her a bag of prescription pills and asked her to discard them. R.449-50. She
described the garbage can at the 7-Eleven store where she disposed of the pills.
R.451. She was nervous because she was on felony probation at the time. R.451.
She did not know to whom the pills belonged. R.451. Neither Salazar nor Mrs.
Salazar told Det. Olson that they knew what Young intended to do when they
brought him to Homeowner's house. R.461-62. Det. Olson allowed Salazar to
leave but arrested Young and Mrs. Salazar. R.457.
Det. Olson obtained the surveillance video from the 7-Eleven. R.426,459;
State's Exh. 1A. The video showed no furtive movements in Salazar's car. R.459.
Salazar and Mrs. Salazar got out of the car and went into the store. R.459. Then
Salazar pumped gas. R.460. In the video, Mrs. Salazar, on the passenger side, is
seen interacting with Young, seated in the backseat, and then going to the trash
can, away from the gas pump. R.460; State's Exh. 1A. The 7-Eleven was located
on a busy, noisy street. R.460.
6

Det. Olson believed that Young entered the house alone. R.461.
The Defense Case
Young testified for Salazar. R.487-507. He testified that on July 6, 2015, he
was at his sister's house because he had been kicked out of the place where he
had been staying. R.487-88,500-01. Young's sister knew Mrs. Salazar. R.488.
That day, Mrs. Salazar came over to see Young's sister. R.488. Young did not
know Salazar or Mrs. Salazar until he met them at his sister's. R.502-03. Young
asked Mrs. Salazar for a ride to the house he was renting so he could get his
belongings. R.489,503-04. He did not tell anyone that he wanted to go to a house
and steal. R.491. The Salazars said they could give him a ride but that it had to be
quick. R.489.
Young told Salazar where to drive. R.489. Young said "Stop right here, and
I'll . . . run and get my stuff." R.489. Young did not point out the specific house.
R.490. He got out of the car, ran around a house, jumped the back fence, ran
across the backyard, and kicked in the basement door. R.490-91,505. Once in the
house, Young stole a bag of pills and empty boxes. R.491-92. He took the pills
because he hoped they were pain pills and he was struggling with a drug
addiction. R.491-92,501-02. He went back out the back door and out to the front
of the house, where he ran over to Salazar's car and told him to hurry up. R.492.
Salazar drove away. R.493. Young thought a truck was following them. R.493.
Young was concerned that someone was trying to get the property back. R.49394. He told the Salazars that there might be somebody in the truck trying to
7

reclaim items that Young had stolen. R.493-94. He said, "I think these guys are
going to come beat me up because I got my stuff out of the house." R.494,497. He
said it with some urgency to let Salazar know that he was worried and Salazar
should not stop. R.494-95. The truck disappeared and Salazar pulled into the
parking lot of a convenience store. R.495. Young never got out of the car. R.496.
Salazar went into the store. R.496. Young believed that Mrs. Salazar stayed in the
car except for when Young asked her to throw the bag of pills in the trash. R.49697,505. After Salazar got back to the car, they drove back the way they had come.
R.497. Salazar did not demonstrate any concerns about what had happened at the
house or at the gas station. R.498. When Det. Olson signaled for them to pull
over, Young thought it was for Young's burglary and theft. R.498-99.
Young did not remember speaking with Det. Olson although he
remembered that he talked to an officer. R.504. He didn't remember telling the
officer that Mrs. Salazar was throwing small boxes from the car as they drove
away from the truck or that he told Det. Olson that he asked Mrs. Salazar to
discard the pills at the 7-Eleven. R.505. He testified that he told Det. Olson that
Salazar had nothing to do with Young's burglary. R.507.
Defense counsel also re-called Det. Olson. R.508. According to Det. Olson,
Young initially told Det. Olson that Salazar and Mrs. Salazar had picked up Young
at a different 7-Eleven. R.509. Young initially lied to the detective. R.457,463-64.
Det. Olson told Young that Salazar and Mrs. Salazar had told him the truth, that
they had driven him up to a home. R.509. At that point, Young told Det. Olson
8

that he had gone to Homeowner's home, knocked down the back door, and stolen
items. R.509.
Procedural History
The State charged Salazar with one count of Burglary, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-202, and one count of Theft, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-404. R.1-2,552.
Mrs. Salazar died before trial. R.427-28. At trial 1, the State proposed to
introduce Mrs. Salazar's statements to Det. Olson. R.427. Defense counsel
objected, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay and violated the
Confrontation Clause. R.427-46,485. The trial court overruled counsel's objection
and ruled that under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Mrs. Salazar's
statements were admissible because Mrs. Salazar was unavailable and the
statements were against her interest. R.445-47 (a transcript of parties' arguments
and the trial court ruling is attached as Addendum A). The trial court also ruled
that admitting the statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause because
Salazar could confront Mrs. Salazar's hearsay statements by calling Young as a
witness or by choosing to testify himself. R.445-46. Det. Olson testified about
Mrs. Salazar's statements. R.449-62.
At the close of the State's case, defense counsel moved for a directed
verdict, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove that Salazar had the mens

On April 27, 2017, Salazar waived his right to have a preliminary hearing.
Docket, Case No. 171901573.
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rea to commit Burglary or theft as a party because all the evidence showed was
that Salazar gave Young a ride to the location of the crimes. R.477. The trial court
denied the motion for directed verdict because the jury needed only to find that
Salazar had the mental state required to commit the offense and that he
"solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided another to
commit the offense. . . ." R.480. The trial court found that Witness seeing Young
run to Salazar's car and Salazar driving quickly away and identifying Salazar, plus
the video evidence and Mrs. Salazar's statement could support a reasonable jury
concluding that Salazar intentionally aided Young in committing the offenses.
R.480-83.
The jury convicted Salazar as charged. R.552. The trial court sentenced
Salazar to serve one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for Burglary, but
suspended the prison commitment. R.220, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment,
attached as Addendum B. The trial court sentenced Salazar to serve one hundred
eighty days in jail for the Theft, granting credit for seven days served. R.221,60305. Salazar timely appeals. R.227.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of
Mrs. Salazar's out-of-court statement and remand the case for a new trial. First,
the trial court should have excluded Mrs. Salazar's statements because they
violated the Confrontation Clause. Mrs. Salazar's statements to Det. Olson were
testimonial; therefore Salazar had the constitutional right to confront and cross
10

examine Mrs. Salazar concerning the statement. Where Salazar had no
opportunity to confront or cross examine Mrs. Salazar, the trial court violated his
constitutional right of confrontation. Moreover, the error was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, the trial court should have excluded Mrs. Salazar's statements
because they were inadmissible. The trial court erred by admitting the statement
under Rule 804(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence because the statements were
hearsay and she did not make the statements against her own interest. This error
was also harmful.
ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court erred by admitting Mrs. Salazar's out-of-court
statement, in violation of Salazar's constitutional right to
confront his accusers.
The trial court violated Salazar's right to confront and cross-examine a

witness when it allowed Mrs. Salazar's hearsay statements to substitute for incourt testimony. “The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that, ‘in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with
witnesses against him.’ [The Supreme Court has] held that this bedrock
procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state prosecutions.” Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (alterations omitted) (Sixth Amendment
attached as Addendum C). The Confrontation Clause “bars admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross11

examination.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
This Court should reverse because Mrs. Salazar's statements were
testimonial and could not be used against Salazar at trial. “Statements are
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Id. at
822. “They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there
is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.” Id. "Statements taken by police officers in the course of
interrogations are also testimonial. . . ." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
In Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court further explained that in Crawford, the
U.S. Supreme Court considered testimonial all statements that were the product
of “interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, in order
to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator.” Davis, 547 U.S. at
826 (explaining Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53). Davis held to be testimonial
statements that “deliberately recounted, in response to police questioning, how
potentially criminal past events began and progressed” “some time after the
events described were over.” Id. at 830. For example, the testimonial statements
in Davis were from a woman to police officers investigating domestic battery that
had occurred earlier that day. Id. at 817-20. “Such statements under official
12

interrogation are an obvious substitute for live testimony, because they do
precisely what a witness does on direct examination; they are inherently
testimonial.” Id. at 830.
By contrast, in Salt Lake City v. George, this Court determined that
certificates concerning breath test calibrations were not testimonial statements.
2008 UT App 257, ¶¶ 1-2,10-14,189 P.3d 1284. The certificates were
"uncharacteristic of the typical kind of testimonial evidence at which the
Confrontation Clause was aimed, i.e., ex parte examination of witnesses intended
to be used against a particular defendant." Id. ¶ 11. The certificates were
prepared, as mandated by the Utah Administrative Code, to ensure the continued
proper functioning of the intoxilyzer machines. Id. ¶ 12. They were not prepared
in preparation to "prosecut[e] . . . a specific defendant." Id. Thus, they were
deemed non-testimonial. Id. ¶¶ 12-14.
While "exceptions to the hearsay rule" do not generally violate the
Confrontation Clause, "the right of a defendant to confront an accuser may bar
evidence that might otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay
rule." State v. Villareal, 889 P.2d 419, 424 (Utah 1995). In Villareal, a case of
aggravated kidnapping, rape of a child, and sodomy on a child, officers testified
as to the content of in-custody statements made by a co-perpetrator. Id. at 423.
Prior to the officers' testimony, the prosecutor had presented the co-perpetrator
as a witness, ascertained that the co-perpetrator refused to testify, and then
"propounded a long series of factual propositions in the form of leading
13

questions" based on the co-perpetrator's confession. Id. at 422-23. "[T]o avoid
violation of [the defendant's] right to confront his accuser, [the co-perpetrator's]
statements must have been subject to cross-examination." Id. at 425.
Here, the trial court erred because admitting Mrs. Salazar's statement
violated the Confrontation Clause. First, Mrs. Salazar's statements were
testimonial. Second, Salazar had no opportunity to cross examine Mrs. Salazar
concerning her testimonial statements. Finally, the error was prejudicial.
First, the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause by admitting Mrs.
Salazar's testimonial statement. As held in Crawford, Davis, and George,
statements made to police officers interrogating for evidence of a crime, rather
than responding to an ongoing emergency, are testimonial. See Crawford, 541
U.S. at 52-53; Davis, 547 U.S. at 821-22,826,830; George, 2008 UT App 257, ¶
11. As in Crawford, Mrs. Salazar's statements were made while she was a
potential suspect of a reported crime. See Crawford, 541 U.S at 38-39,52,65;
R.417,420-21,452. Also as in Crawford, Det. Olson's purpose in interrogating
Mrs. Salazar was to investigate the reported crime. See id.; R.417,420-21,449-52.
Det. Olson's reading Miranda warnings would have caused Mrs. Salazar to
"reasonably expect" that her statements would "be used prosecutorially," and that
they would be "available for use at a later trial." See id. at 52; R.421,449,455-56.
Unlike in Davis, Det. Olson's questions were not "to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency" because Det. Olson did not witness any crimes and
only stopped the Salazars' car to investigate the reported burglary. R.415-16; see
14

Davis, 547 U.S. at 828; R.462. Thus, Mrs. Salazar's statements to Det. Olson were
testimonial.
Second, because Mrs. Salazar's statements were testimonial, Salazar had
the right to confront and cross examine Mrs. Salazar. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at
59; Davis, 547 U.S. at 821; Villareal, 889 P.2d at 425. Because Salazar had no
opportunity to cross examine Mrs. Salazar, admission of her statement violated
the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; Davis, 547 U.S. at 821;
Villareal, 889 P.2d at 425; R.427-28.
Finally, admission of Mrs. Salazar's statement in violation of the
Confrontation Clause was prejudicial. "For an error to be reversible, it must be
harmful." Villareal, 889 P.2d at 425. "Where 'the error in question amounts to a
violation of a defendant's right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, its harmlessness is to be judged by
a higher standard, i.e., reversal is required unless the error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. In Villareal, our supreme court considered "the
importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecutor's case, whether the
testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence collaborating or
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of crossexamination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the
prosecution's case." Id. at 425-26 (quoting State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 205
(Utah 1987)). In Villareal, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because the co-perpetrator simply confirmed another witness and confirmed the
15

defendant's confession. Id. at 426. "[T]he case against [the defendant] was so
overwhelming that the violations of his right to confront his accuser were
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
Unlike in Villareal, the trial court's error in this case was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Consideration of factors set forth in Villareal
indicates the trial court's error was harmful. See Villareal, 889 P.2d at 425-426.
Mrs. Salazar's statement was important to the State's case for two reasons. See id.
at 425-26. First, Mrs. Salazar's calling Young their friend suggested an affiliation
between Young and the Salazars that was found nowhere else in the record.
R.449-51,488,502-03. Second, as Young's friend and Salazar's wife, Mrs.
Salazar's statement that she discarded Homeowner's wife's pills invited the jury
to base inferences of Salazar's knowledge on Mrs. Salazar's actions. R.42728,449-51. As such, the "importance of the [out-of-court statement] in the
prosecutor's case" was high and was not cumulative. See id.
Further, other Villareal factors indicate the error was not harmless. See id.
There was no "cross-examination otherwise permitted" because Mrs. Salazar was
deceased. See id.; R.427-28. Moreover, the State's "overall" case was not
overwhelming. See id. The evidence was undisputed that Salazar never entered
Homeowner's home. R.461. Young testified that not only was Salazar unaware
that Young had burgled the home but Young provided Salazar a reasonable
explanation for Witness following them. R.489,493-95,497,507. He reiterated to
Salazar that he had only taken his own possessions. R.493-95. He testified that he
16

informed law enforcement that Salazar had no involvement in the crimes. R.507.
Moreover, Det. Olson did not observe Salazar committing any crime, including
speeding or reckless driving. R.462.
Finally, in addition to not being harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the
State's reliance on Mrs. Salazar's statement in its closing arguments indicates
that the error was not harmless. This Court will reverse a verdict for evidentiary
error “if the admission of the evidence . . . reasonably” affected “the likelihood of
a different verdict.” State v. Davis, 2013 UT App 228, ¶ 80, 311 P.3d 538
(abrogated on other grounds, State v. Ringstad, 2018 UT App 66, ---P.3d.---). In
Davis, which involved object rape and forcible sodomy, the defendant
successfully argued that some admitted evidence was irrelevant. Id. ¶¶ 1,6465,77-79. However, this Court determined that “any facts the jury could
reasonably have inferred from the [erroneously admitted evidence] were
presented to the jury in [] other testimony.” Id. Moreover, the State did not refer
to the irrelevant evidence in closing. Id. ¶ 83. Admission was therefore harmless.
Id. ¶¶ 80-84.
But here, unlike in Davis, the State emphasized Mrs. Salazar's hearsay
statement in closing arguments. See id. ¶ 83. The State said that Mrs. Salazar said
that Young "handed her the prescription medication which she discarded,"
linking it to the video evidence from the 7-Eleven store. R.536-38, State's Exh.
1A. The State again supported its theory that all three individuals, Salazar, Mrs.
Salazar, and Young, shared the same mens rea when the State argued on rebuttal
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that the three tried to discard items at the 7-Eleven. R.547. The trial court's
reference to Mrs. Salazar's statement in denying Salazar's motion for directed
verdict indicated that the trial court considered her statement as incriminating
Salazar. R.481. The State's and the trial court's repeated references to the
statement demonstrate the importance of the statement to the State's case. Thus,
the error was not harmless and, a fortiori, was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
II.

The trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence in
violation of Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3).
The trial court violated Rule 804(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence when

it admitted statements from the deceased Mrs. Salazar to Det. Olson. (Rule
804(b)(3) is attached as Addendum D.) The trial court erred because Mrs.
Salazar's statements were hearsay and she did not make the statements against
her own interest. Moreover, the error was harmful because absent the hearsay
evidence, the jury was reasonably likely to have reached a different result.
Hearsay is a “statement that [] the declarant does not make while testifying
at the current trial or hearing; and [] a party offers in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted in the statement.” Utah R. Evid. 801(c). "Hearsay is not
admissible except as provided by law or by" the Utah Rules of Evidence. Utah R.
Evid. 802.
One exception to the prohibition on hearsay is statements that are made by
an unavailable declarant that are not in the declarant's interest. Utah R. Evid.
804(b)(3). A statement against interest is one that "a reasonable person in the
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declarant's position would have made only if the person believed it to be true
because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarant's proprietary or
pecuniary interest . . . or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . ."
Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(A). The statement must also be "supported by
corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is
offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to criminal
liability." Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(B).
Appellate courts "'look to the circumstances under which the statement
was given'" to determine whether the statement "'is one made against penal
interest.'" State v. Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶ 19, 362 P.3d 1216 (quoting State v.
Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)); see also Williamson v. United
States, 512 U.S. 594, 603-04 (1994). "The statement need not be an outright
confession to a crime in order to be sufficiently contrary to the declarant's penal
interest to be admissible." Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶ 19.
But Rule 804(b)(3) "cover[s] only those" statements "that are individually
self-inculpatory." Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599 (holding that Rule 804(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence did not make admissible an in-custody statement
inculpating the declarant and others). "The fact that a person is making a broadly
self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible the confession's nonself-inculpatory parts." Id. "Self-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones
which people are most likely to make even when they are false; and mere
proximity to other, self-inculpatory, statements does not increase the plausibility
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of the self-exculpatory statements." Id. at 600. "The fact that a statement is selfinculpatory does make it more reliable; but the fact that a statement is collateral
to a self-inculpatory statement says nothing at all about the collateral statement's
reliability." Id. "We see no reason why collateral statements, even ones that are
neutral as to interest . . . should be treated any differently from other hearsay
statements that are generally excluded." Id. "[T]he most faithful reading of Rule
804(b)(3) is that it does not allow admission of non-self-exculpatory statements,
even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally selfinculpatory." Id. at 600-01. "Thus a statement admitting guilt and implicating
another person, made while in custody, may well be motivated by a desire to
curry favor with the authorities and hence fail to qualify as against interest." Id.
at 601 (quoting Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 804(b)(3)). "On the other
hand, the same words spoken under different circumstances, e.g., to an
acquaintance, would have no difficulty in qualifying . . . ." Id. at 601-02.
For example, in Williamson, a case about a cocaine shipment, the arrested
driver's statement that he was transporting the cocaine for the defendant did not
qualify as sufficiently against the declarant's self-interest for admission. Id. at
596-97,604. Although the defendant's admission—that he knew the cocaine was
in his trunk—was self-inculpatory, "other parts of his confession, especially the
parts that implicated [the defendant], did little to subject [the declarant] himself
to criminal liability." Id. at 604. "A reasonable person in [the declarant's] position
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might even think that implicating someone else would decrease his practical
exposure to criminal liability, at least as far as sentencing goes." Id.
Similarly, in Clopten, a murder case, the proposed witness's testimony, that
the declarant was present at the time of the murder and that the defendant was
not the murderer, was insufficiently against self-interest to be admissible under
Rule 804(b)(3). See Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶¶ 1-2,16-21. In Clopten, someone shot
the victim; the declarant, the defendant, and two other men escaped in a vehicle.
Id. ¶¶ 10,20. The declarant's words to other prisoners, "I was there and I can tell
you for a fact it wasn't him," were somewhat against the declarant's interest
because he "would have known that the police suspected that one of these four
individuals murdered [the victim]." Id. ¶¶ 16,20. "Under these circumstances,
statements exculpating [the defendant] necessarily indicate that one of the three
[other] occupants of the vehicle was the shooter." Id. ¶ 20. But the declarant
"never said that he committed the murder." Id. "Although [the declarant's]
statements have at least some tendency to expose him to criminal liability, this
does not necessarily mean that his statements have a sufficient tendency to
expose him to punishment 2 that a reasonable person would not utter them if they
were not true." Id. ¶ 21. Our supreme court found no error in the trial court's
determination that the declarant's statements had insufficient "tendency to
expose him to criminal punishment that 'a reasonable person in the declarant's
Another motive for the declarant's statement was that the declarant, the
defendant's cousin, did not want other prisoners to harm the defendant in prison.
Id. ¶ 21.

2
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position would have made [the statements] only if the person believed [them] to
be true.'" Id. (quoting Rule 804(b)(3)).
By contrast, in United States v. Smalls, a co-defendant to murder bragged
to a confidential informant how the co-defendant, the defendant, and others had
murdered a fellow prisoner. 605 F.3d 765, 769-772 (10th Cir. 2010). The codefendant and confidential informant were in a cell together. Id. at 768. The codefendant "constantly talked about the murder over a two-month period." Id.
When the confidential informant expressed concern that someone involved in the
murder might "flip," the co-defendant explained how there were four men in the
cell and three participated in killing the fourth man. Id. at 768-72. The codefendant said he had suggested the killing and held the victim's hands while the
defendant held the victim's feet and the other cellmate put a plastic bag over the
victim's head, suffocating him. Id. at 769,772. Then the co-defendant flushed the
plastic bag down the toilet. Id. at 771. "But ain't nobody gonna say nothin' I ain't
gonna worry about that shit . . . That was a clean one right there," said the codefendant, explaining how none of the participants could be witnesses without
confessing their own participation in the murder. Id.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that some of the co-defendant's
statement was admissible. Id. at 783-87. During the conversation, the codefendant "most certainly was not seeking to curry favor with authorities in
recounting the specifics of [the] murder . . . or seeking to shift or spread blame to
his alleged co-conspirators so as to engender more favorable treatment from
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authorities." Id. at 783. The casual conversation "provid[ed] a 'circumstantial
guarantee' of reliability not found in statements, arrest, custodial or otherwise,
knowingly made to law enforcement officials." Id. The co-defendant "rather than
seeking to shift blame repeatedly opined that because all three men were involved
in [the victim's] murder, none of them could say anything." Id. at 785. While
some statements were arguably exculpatory, much of the co-defendant's
statement "plainly [spoke] to a conspiracy to commit murder, an act of murder,
and a motive for murder." "While [the co-defendant] stated he did not personally
hold the bag over [the victim's] head or hold down [the victim's] legs . . . [the codefendant], as an alleged co-conspirator, was certainly legally responsible for
those acts." Id. "These comments as to how precisely [the victim's] murder
occurred are undoubtedly against [the co-defendant's] penal interest and,
coupled with the circumstances of their making, trustworthy to the extent
required by Rule 804(b)(3)." Id. "[T]hat makes them sufficiently against [the codefendant's] penal interest, rendering them admissible under Rule 804(b)(3)."
Id. at 785-86 (italics in original).
Mindful of Williamson, the Tenth Circuit remanded Smalls, directing the
district court to determine what parts of the co-defendant's statements were
admissible. Id. at 786-87. First, the district court was to determine what parts of
the co-defendant's confession were "sufficiently against [the co-defendant's]
penal interest" to be admissible. Id. "The [district court] should then subject
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those selected statements not only to [Federal Rules of Evidence] 401 and 402's
relevancy requirements, but also to Rule 403's balancing test." Id.
Although this Court reached a different conclusion in Drawn, Drawn
relied on United States Supreme Court case law which has since been overruled.
See Drawn, 791 P.2d at 894. In Drawn, a robbery case, the unavailable witnesses
were women who drove the getaway vehicle. Id. at 891. While under arrest they
"admitted that they waited in the car while defendant robbed the shoe store." Id.
They told police "that after the robbery, they momentarily evaded police, let
defendant out, and threw the money bag and gun out the window." Id. In
determining whether the women's statements were admissible, this Court said
"[h]earsay statements of a witness are admissible at trial provided the State can
show the witness's unavailability and prove that the statement bears adequate
indicia of reliability." Id. at 893 (relying on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66
(1980) (abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)). "Indeed, in
the usual case, the State 'must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability
of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against defendant.'" Id.
(quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65). Because the women's statements were made
while in custody, were "substantially similar," other witnesses had observed the
car, and the statements subjected the women as well as the defendant to
prosecution, this Court concluded there was no error in admitting the statements.
Id. at 894.
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This Court's holding in Drawn is not useful here because the Roberts
holding, which this Court relied on in Drawn, is no longer good law. Roberts, like
Drawn, conditioned admissibility of hearsay evidence on whether the evidence
was within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bore "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness." See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; Drawn, 791 P.2d at 893. The
Crawford court 3 overruled this specific Roberts holding. Crawford, 541 U.S. at
60-62. "Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is
akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty." Id. at
62. Moreover, unlike this Court in Drawn, the United States Supreme Court did
not view the unavailable witness's in-custody status as necessarily enhancing
either reliability or the against-interest quality of the statement. See Drawn, 791
P.2d at 894; compare with Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600-01.
Here, Mrs. Salazar's statement was insufficiently self-inculpatory to be
admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). As in Clopten, Williamson, and Smalls, the
trial court had a duty to exclude those statements which were not fully selfinculpatory. See Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶¶ 20-21; Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599;
Smalls, 605 F.3d at 783-87. The trial court erred in admitting Mrs. Salazar's
conversation with Det. Olson. Cf. Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶¶ 20-21; Williamson, 512
U.S. at 599; Smalls, 605 F.3d at 783-87. Moreover, the error was prejudicial.

Additionally, the Tenth Circuit regarded Davis as "render[ing] Roberts
academic." Smalls, 605 F.2d at 774 (relying on Davis, 547 U.S. at 823-24).

3
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As in Clopten, Mrs. Salazar's statement was not a confession. See Clopten,
2015 UT 82, ¶¶ 20-21. Mrs. Salazar never said that she knew that Young had
stolen from Homeowner's house. See id.; R.449-51,461-62. Nor did she say she
knew the pills were stolen. See id.; R.449-51,461-62. She did not say that she
knew why Young wanted a ride to Homeowner's address. See id., R.449-51,46162. Saying that she and Salazar drove Young, their friend, to an address was even
less of an admission than in Clopten because, unlike in Clopten, she said she did
not know exactly where they drove Young. Cf. id. ¶¶ 16,20-21; R.449. Also, unlike
in Clopten, she did not say that she knew what Young did. Cf. id. ¶¶ 16,20-21;
R.449-51,461-62. As in Clopten, Mrs. Salazar admitted to being in the car when
someone else committed a crime. See id.; R.449-51,461-62.
In fact, as in Williamson, many of Mrs. Salazar's statements were selfexculpatory. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600-01. She denied knowing the address
where she and Salazar dropped off Young. R.449. Moreover, her admission to
discarding the pills was self-exculpatory. Trial counsel, relying on the State's
proffer that Det. Olson would testify that Mrs. Salazar knew the pills belonged to
Homeowner's wife, allowed that Mrs. Salazar's statement about discarding the
pills could incriminate Mrs. Salazar as obstruction of justice. R.433,438-39. But
absent evidence 4 that Mrs. Salazar knew who owned the pills, her statement that

Trial counsel for the State proffered that Det. Olson would testify that Mrs.
Salazar said she thought that the pills she discarded belonged to the
Homeowner's wife. R.429. But, Det. Olson's actual testimony was that Mrs.
Salazar said she did not know whose pills they were. R.451.

4
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she discarded the pills was self-exculpatory. Mrs. Salazar, nervous because she
was on felony probation, likely had a self-exculpatory purpose in telling Det.
Olson how she discarded the pills because Utah law prohibits possessing
controlled substances. See id.; see also Utah Code § 58-37-8(2)(a); but see State
v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, ¶ 24, 193 P.3d 92 (holding that possession of controlled
substance "excludes temporary possession of a controlled substance for the
purpose of returning it to its rightful owner"); R.449-51. Her claim not to have
known who the pills belonged to was similarly self-exculpatory. See id.; R.451.
Although in Smalls, the Tenth Circuit remanded for the trial court to
determine if any of the statement at issue was admissible, this Court should not
similarly remand for that purpose because none of Mrs. Salazar's statements
were admissible. See Smalls, 605 F.3d at 786-87. None of Mrs. Salazar's
statements have a sufficient tendency to expose Mrs. Salazar to punishment. See
Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶ 21; cf. Smalls, 605 F.3d at 786-87. As in Clopten,
admitting to being present in the same car as someone who commits a crime is
not self-inculpatory. 2015 UT 82, ¶¶ 16,21; R.449-51. Similarly, Mrs. Salazar's
statement that Young got out of the car and came back, and that they left for the
7-Eleven store is not an admission that she knew of or intended to participate in
Young's crime. See id.; R.449-51,460-61. As argued above, that Mrs. Salazar said
she accepted and discarded the pills is more consistent with self-exculpation than
self-inculpation. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600-01; R.449-51. Moreover,
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although Det. Olson arrested 5 Mrs. Salazar, nothing in the record indicates she
was prosecuted as a result of her statements. There is nothing in Mrs. Salazar's
statement that is sufficiently self-inculpatory to make any part admissible under
Rule 804(b)(3). But if this Court deems otherwise, this Court should remand for
the trial court to first determine whether any part of Mrs. Salazar's statements
should have been excluded as non-self-exculpatory and, if so, to hold a new trial.
See Smalls, 605 F.3d at 786-87.
The error was prejudicial. "[A]n erroneous decision to admit or exclude
evidence does not[, however] result in reversible error unless the error is
harmful." State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ¶ 38, 32 P.3d 976. In, Webster,
which involved allegations of wrongful appropriation of a car, this Court
considered whether the prior bad acts evidence and the defendant's wife's
hearsay admissions to a detective were prejudicial. Id. ¶¶ 1,38-39. Although the
remaining evidence was sufficient to have convicted the defendant, this Court
was "not confident that the jury would still have found the defendant guilty." Id. ¶
39. Similarly, in State v. Ellis, our supreme court having held that hearsay was
inadmissible because the declarant was not unavailable, said that "[p]rejudice
analysis is counterfactual." 2018 UT 2, ¶¶ 24-25,42, 417 P.3d 86. That means
considering "an alternative universe in which the trial went off without the error."
It is common for courts to require those on felony probation to avoid the
company of persons who are committing crimes or using illegal drugs. Young
testified that his actions were because of his drug addiction. R.491-92,501-02.
Det. Olson may have believed that Mrs. Salazar had sufficiently violated her
probation to merit arrest by being in Young's company.
5
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Id. Or, it may mean an alternative hypothetical universe in which the absent
witness testified in person and was subject to cross examination. Id. n. 2.
Here, admitting the hearsay was prejudicial. "Without" Mrs. Salazar's
statement, "the State's case amounted to the following:" Homeowner's house was
burgled on July 6, 2015. See Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ¶ 39; R.401-06,410-11.
Witness saw Salazar driving his white Honda slowly, against the curb, going
around the area twice, with his wife in the car. R.420,465-69,472-73. Young
trotted from between houses, got into the car, and they drove away quickly both
from the house and from Witness's truck when Witness tried to follow. R.47071,473-74. Det. Olson pulled over Salazar's car. R.416-20,449,452-53,463. PostMiranda, Salazar said that he had given Young a ride, that Young had gotten out
of the car, was gone for a few minutes, and returned to the vehicle, carrying some
items. R.423-24,456,463. They drove away from Witness because Witness
appeared to be following them. R.425. They stopped for gas at 7-Eleven, where
Salazar pumped gas and Mrs. Salazar interacted with Young, and then Mrs.
Salazar walked away from the car, away from the direction where Salazar was
pumping gas. R.425,459-60; State's Exh. 1A. Upon getting stopped, Salazar
assumed that Young must have stolen something. R.427. As argued in Point I, in
the "alternative universe in which the trial went off without the error," the jury,
"in these circumstances is reasonably likely to have reached a different verdict."
See Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶ 42.
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Counterfactually, had Mrs. Salazar been able to testify, the record supports
that there is a reasonable likelihood that she might have explained her statement
to deny her own and Salazar's involvement in Young's crime. See id., n. 2. Mrs.
Salazar might reasonably have been expected to have explained that if she had
referred to Young as a friend, she meant that he was the brother of her friend. See
id.; R.449-51,488,502-03. There is a reasonable likelihood that she would have
clarified that she did not know what Young did outside of the car because he told
the Salazars that he was retrieving his own possessions and they could not see
him in the back of the house. See id.; R.409-10,461-62,489,491,503. There is a
reasonable likelihood that she would have clarified that she did not know who
owned the pills she discarded because there was no evidence that she ever read
the labels but simply discarded Young's trash because he was still in the car. See
id.; R.449-51; State's Exh. 1A. That Mrs. Salazar's statements were admitted
without Salazar receiving the opportunity to ask Mrs. Salazar for clarification,
either on cross examination or direct examination, was prejudicial to Salazar's
case.
Without Mrs. Salazar's hearsay statements, there is a reasonable likelihood
that Salazar's trial counsel might have preferred not to present testimony from
Young. "[O]nce a court has ruled counsel must make the best of the situation."
State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶ 44, 387 P.3d 618. The trial court suggested
that Salazar address the hearsay by cross-examining Witness and presenting
Young as a witness. R.445. Thus, Salazar presented Young's testimony, which was
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that he had gotten a ride from the Salazars without previously knowing them.
R.488,502-04. He told them that he needed to recover his belongings from a
house he was renting. R.498,503. He told Salazar where to drive, and then told
him to stop and wait while Young got his stuff. R.489. Out of view of the road,
Young then kicked in the back door of Homeowner's house, stole items including
medications, and ran back to the car, telling Salazar to hurry away. R.49092,505. He explained that Witness was following, intending to hurt Young
because Young recovered items belonging to Young. R.493-95,497. At the 7Eleven, Young asked Mrs. Salazar to discard the baggie of pills. See id.; R.49697,505.
But for Mrs. Salazar's hearsay statements, there is a reasonable likelihood
that the jury would not have convicted. See Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ¶ 39.
"[H]ad the jury not been given the additional evidence indicating that" Salazar's
deceased wife described Young as a friend or that she had agreed to discard pills
in prescription bottles with Homeowner's wife's name on them, this Court should
not be "confident that the jury would still have found [Salazar] guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt" of being involved in Young's burglary and theft. See id.;
R.403,449-51; State's Exh. 11. That is because no witness would have described
Young as a "friend" of the Salazars. R.488,502-03. Moreover, absent the trial
court's erroneous ruling, there is a reasonable likelihood that Salazar's counsel
would not have presented testimony from Young which included Young saying
that he asked Mrs. Salazar to discard the pills. See Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶ 44;
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R.439-40,496-97,505. This is especially true where the trial court suggested
presenting Young as a defense witness to confront the unavailable Mrs. Salazar.
See id.; R.445. Absent the hearsay evidence in which Young was described as a
"friend" of the Salazars and in which Mrs. Salazar agreed to discard Homeowner's
wife's pills, there is a reasonable likelihood of a better outcome for Salazar.
Moreover, as argued in Point I, infra, the State's reliance on the hearsay
evidence in closing demonstrated further harm. See Davis, 2013 UT App 228, ¶¶
83-84. Mrs. Salazar's hearsay statement allowed the State to argue that Salazar,
Mrs. Salazar, and Young all shared the same mens rea. R.536-38,547; State's Exh.
1A. For example, the State argued that Mrs. Salazar "basically indicated, yeah, at
some point [Young] also handed her some prescription medication which she
discarded." R.536. The State also discussed the video. R.537. The State argued
that in the video, where Mrs. Salazar is seen getting out of the car, "she kind of
walks around and you can't see what's happen[ing] because the gas pump is
blocking it, but safe to assume there's probably a trash can over there and she
does something . . . and then at some point then [Salazar and Mrs. Salazar] walk
in [to the 7-Eleven]." R.537-38. The State argued, from Mrs. Salazar's statements
matching what was visible in the video, plus photographs from the trash can,
"[a]nd so did [Salazar] know what was going on? Yes. Did [Mrs. Salazar] know
what was going on? Yes." R.538. Although the State had the videos and
photographs, it was Mrs. Salazar's statements that enabled the State to imply an
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affinity and common plan between Young and the Salazars that the exhibits did
not otherwise portray. Thus, the trial court's error was prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
Salazar respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling on
Mrs. Salazar's out-of-court statement and remand this case for a new trial.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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____________________________________
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)
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____________________________________)
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TRANSCRIPT OF:
JURY TRIAL
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1

Q.

And what did he say?

2

A.

He didn't provide much information regarding it, says

3

he was kind of unsure but assumed that he had stolen something.

4

Q.

You had a chance to talk to Nikki Salazar as well?

5

A.

I did.

6

Q.

And who's Nikki Salazar?

7

A.

Nikki Salazar is Eddie Salazar's wife.

8

Q.

And what did Nikki Salazar tell you?
MR. BAUTISTA:

9
10

MR. TAN:

11

THE COURT:

Your Honor, I believe it's --

12
THE COURT:

14

MR. TAN:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. TAN:

And I believe --

THE COURT:

Well, is it hearsay, is the first

question?
MR. TAN:

21

THE COURT:

23

What -- what is your offer of proof?

As far as it's a hearsay exception,

20

22

How -- you have a hearsay objection.

under --

18
19

Can you approach?
(Bench conference.)

13

17

Objection 802.

And I don't believe it is under 801.
What -- what are you suggesting that he's

going to say?
MR. TAN:

That Nikki Salazar was aware in regards to

24

what the three of them were doing that day, and that

25

Steve Young, one of the coconspirators asked that they actually
DETECTIVE DAMIEN OLSON - Direct by MR. TAN
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1

throw some of the evidence away at the 7-Eleven.
THE COURT:

2
3

And I understand she's dead, right

now?

4

MR. TAN:

5

THE COURT:

6

Okay.

Yes, that's correct.
Why don't we take a brief break and let

the -- let the jury go we'll talk more about this.

7

MR. TAN:

8

(End of bench conference.)

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

This is a good time for a break.

We will

10

take probably about a ten-minute break.

11

members of the jury to -- to not discuss the case or any issues

12

related to the case at this time, and certainly to not form any

13

opinions until you've heard all of the evidence.

14

THE BAILIFF:

15

(Jury exits the courtroom.)

16

THE COURT:

17

step down.

18

the offer of proof.

All rise for the jury.

Please be seated.

You can go ahead and

I'm going to still have a bench conference as to

19

(Bench conference.)

20

THE COURT:

21

I want to remind

So, you're saying that -- well, first of

all, Nikki Salazar is dead, correct?

22

MR. TAN:

23

MR. BAUTISTA:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. BAUTISTA:

As far as we know.
Yes.

At least we had an obituary?
Yes, she's passed.
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THE COURT:

1
2

So Nikki, you're saying that she's going

to say what?
MR. TAN:

3

So that they were just driving around, that

4

Steve exited and returned a few minutes later, they stopped at

5

7-Eleven and Steve handed her a plastic bag containing some

6

prescription pills which she discarded, which I believe is one

7

of the State's exhibits that's been admitted.

8

also -- and -- and the -- the last thing is, she thinks that

9

the pills belonged to the homeowner.
THE COURT:

10

Okay.

And that she

So there hearsay objection.

11

let's go through each of these items.

12

around.

13

asserted?

So

That they were driving

I assume that's put in for the truth of the matter

14

MR. TAN:

15

THE COURT:

Correct.
That Steve exited for a few minutes

16

and

17

the truth of the matter asserted.

-- to the home, and later came back.

18

MR. TAN:

19

THE COURT:

20

the pills.

21

asserted?

I assume that's for

Right.
And Steve Young asked her to dispose of

I assume that's for the truth of the matter

22

MR. TAN:

23

THE COURT:

Yes.
And finally, she thinks the pills belong

24

to the homeowner.

25

for the truth of the matter asserted; is that correct?

It's probably a real 701 opinion, but it's
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1

MR. TAN:

2

THE COURT:

3
4

That's correct.
Okay.

What is the hearsay exception

then?
MR. TAN:

Your Honor, I believe under 801, Subsection

5

d, No. 2, subsection E, statements that are not hearsay.

6

statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay,

7

an opposing party's statement.

8

to the opposing party and was made by the party's

9

coconspirators during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. BAUTISTA:

12
13

A

The statement is offered again

Okay.
The problem is multi -- no. 1.

I

think they have -THE COURT:

I'm sorry.

At this point we've -- we've

14

got the offer of proof, I think we can go ahead and argue it on

15

the record.

16

testimony.

I just didn't want to taint the witness's

17

MR. BAUTISTA:

18

(End of bench conference.)

19

THE COURT:

Oh, okay.

Okay.

So the issue the State is arguing

20

that the statements and the offer of proof were under 801(d)2

21

subpart E.

22

Salazar was a coconspirator with the defendant, and it was made

23

during and in furtherance of the conspiracy?

Go ahead, Mr. Tan.

24

MR. TAN:

25

THE COURT:

So you're arguing that Nikki

That's correct.
The question I have is:

If it's an
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1

admission to a police officer, is it during the conspiracy or

2

is it in furtherance of the conspiracy?

3

-- it appears to be a kind of a confession.

4

during a conspiracy and is it in furtherance of a conspiracy?

5

MR. TAN:

In other words, it's
Which is that

I believe the content of her statements

6

itself is during the conspiracy, and also in furtherance,

7

because the -- and -- and I don't if we need to approach the

8

bench again, to --

9

THE COURT:

If you want to approach, let's do it.

10

(Bench conference.)

11

MR. TAN:

The part she tells the officer that

12

Mr. Young told her to discard some of the evidence, I think

13

that's in furtherance of the conspiracy as well.

14

THE COURT:

So if I can--

I guess the question I have is:

Normally

15

801(d)2E is a party -- a coconspirator says something and you

16

have a witness who hears it.

17

admission, during the conspiracy being carried out.

18

example, example here might be, if somebody heard her say, "Get

19

in the car we need to get out of here," while this alleged

20

incident was taking place when -- once -- once the police

21

stopped them, the question I have is:

22

statements during a conspiracy and are they in furtherance of

23

conspiracy?

24
25

MR. TAN:

It's like a party opponent
For

Then are those

And I think that, as I understand it, I

think it's still part of the -- the furtherance of the
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1

conspiracy because at this point, she's still part of an

2

incident where she's still involved in helping out as a

3

coconspirator.

4

has -- when in fact, what we have is one coconspirator telling

5

another coconspirator to discard some of the evidence, and the

6

video, I believe, in my argument would be does show that it's

7

kind of what she did.

I -- I don't think that actual crime itself

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. BAUTISTA:

Okay.

Defense argument?

I don't believe that it actually meets

10

the -- that exception.

11

violation of the confrontation clause.

12

believe the Court is correct that it's in furtherance of the

13

conspiracy would be a situation where someone was in a bank

14

robbery and Bank Robber A tells Bank Robber B, "Don't forget

15

the cash," and a witness overhears that, but only Bank Robber

16

B's at trial.

17

And in addition, it would be in
The problem is:

I

Bank robber A's statement comes in because it was in

18

the conspiracy, it was in the furtherance, or alternatively,

19

when we have an FBI wiretap or FBI undercover agent, for

20

example, on a mob sting, I don't believe that it satisfies

21

that.

22

State has to show independent evidence to support that

23

conspiracy prior to the statement being introduced.

24
25

Further, if it is a conspiracy, they have -- I think the

It's the State's theory of the case that there was a
party offense by all people in the car, but absent of these
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1

statements, they have no -- they have to have independent

2

witness -- other evidence to corroborate these statements that

3

in fact there was a conspiracy.

4

cannot be used as evidence of the conspiracy.

5

not self-authenticating.

6

The statements themselves
They -- they are

Finally, the statement of "Get rid of this property,"

7

doesn't necessarily showing that she's a conspirator, she's

8

helping him get rid of evidence, but she did not maintain it

9

or -- or take possession of it with intent to deprive the owner

10

of it for herself.

She wasn't stealing it.

11

guilty of obstructing justice.

12

don't believe these statements should be allowed.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. TAN:

She might be

But that would be it.

And so I

Reply?

No.

I think what -- as Mr. Bautista

15

indicated, potentially we're looking at additional charges

16

because of what she did.

17

furtherance argument because the State potentially can charge

18

her with obstruction of justice, evidence tampering, based on

19

that statement.

20

In essence, I'm making an in

The other issue though, that I also run into is, for

21

obvious reasons, the declarant, namely being Nikki Salazar is

22

no longer available, she's --

23

THE COURT:

So that gets into a new exception.

24

If -- why don't we deal with this exception and then if there

25

are other exceptions, we can decide where that leads us.
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1

that -- do you have anything else on that?

2

MR. TAN:

3

THE COURT:

Nothing else.
Well, the issue is:

These four

4

statements, and I've just stated on the record that they were

5

all for the truth of the matter asserted, so it's a -- and

6

Nikki Salazar was in the car, the evidence that we have now, is

7

she's in the car with the defendant and Steve Young, who's

8

alleged to have gone into the house and broken in and taken

9

stuff.

10

And she's making statements about the facts of the

11

case for the truth of the matter asserted.

12

is an opposing parties statement, a statement offered against

13

an opposing party and subpart D2E of Rule 801 was made by

14

parties coconspirator during in furtherance of the conspiracy.

15

And the exception

The key words are "during and in furtherance of."

16

These statements are made to the police after they were caught

17

or stopped, and there were separate statements.

18

the -- they're not during the conspiracy because at that point

19

they've been stopped.

20

No, because in a sense it's -- it's an admission of facts that

21

may be used against her personally.

22

conspiracy.

23

prosecute the conspiracy.

24
25

And that

Is it in furtherance of the conspiracy?

It's not further in the

In a sense it's -- it's creating evidence to

After the -- it has been stopped.

Subpart on -- the

comment under D2E is statements by co-conspiracy -- conspirator
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1

of a party made during the course and in furtherance of the

2

conspiracy, admitted as non-hearsay under subdivision D2E have

3

traditionally been admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule.

4

So, and -- and the -- and then the further comment

5

about the old rule of evidence was broader than this rule, in

6

that it provided for the admission of statements made while the

7

party and declarant were participating in a plan to commit a

8

crime or civil wrong if the statement was relevant to the plan

9

or its subject matter, and was made while the plan was in

10

existence, but -- and before it's complete execution or other

11

termination.

12

I mean, I don't know that that directly applies other

13

than to highlight the fact that it's statements made while the

14

crime is taking place, the conspiracy is.

15

satisfy the exception under 801(d)2E.

16

exceptions?

17

MR. TAN:

So it does not

Any other hearsay

We thought the other one would be the

18

declarant, one of the declarants, that being Nikki Salazar is

19

no longer available, because she's deceased.

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

21

the -- the subpart be?

22

think she's unavailable.

23

MR. TAN:

24

THE COURT:

25

Under 804.

That goes to 804, what would

So I'm assuming based upon the -- I

That's correct.
So what is the -- what is the exception?

Do you want to grab your rules?
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1

MR. TAN:

2

THE COURT:

3

(End of bench conference.)

4

THE COURT:

Yes.
And why don't we --

I think we can go -- at this point we can

5

go on to the overall record.

6

argument under Rule 804 that the witness is unavailable and we

7

have the obituary of Nikki Salazar.

8

nobody's contending that Nikki Deal Salazar still alive, are

9

they?

10

MR. BAUTISTA:

11

THE COURT:

12

unavailable?

MR. TAN:

14

THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

Both sides agree that they're

Yes, Your Honor.
And the defense agree that Nikki D.

Salazar is unavailable, Mr. Bautista?
MR. BAUTISTA:

16
17

And I think both sides,

Does the State?

13

15

So I -- the -- there's an

Yes.

Because of her death.

That is

one of the criteria for being unavailable.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. BAUTISTA:

20

MR. TAN:

Okay.

Which is under 084(a)4?

Four.

Trying to pull it up, but for whatever

21

reason the wifi on the internet on my computer is a little bit

22

slow.

23

MR. BAUTISTA:

24

(Conversation between counsel.)

25

THE COURT:

Do you want to come see?

Mr. Tan.
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MR. TAN:

1

Yes, I believe we have been able to pull it

2

up, it is -- I believe it fits under 804 Sub 3, statement

3

against interest.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. TAN:

Okay.

Argument on that, Mr. Tan?

Yes, Your Honor.

So under Sub A, a

6

reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made

7

only if the person believed it be true because when made it was

8

so contrary to the declarant's proprietary [inaudible]

9

interests, or had so great a tendency to invalidate the

10

declarant's claim against someone else or to expose the

11

declarant to civil or criminal liability.

12

facts that we discussed at the bench and I don't want -- unless

13

--

14
15

THE COURT:

We can -- we can -- you can approach and

we can talk about them if you want.

16

MR. TAN:

17

(Bench conference.)

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

And again I just don't want --

That's fine.

You're welcome to put it up

19

here if that would be helpful to you.

20

likely to be recorded if it's closer.

21

Again, for the same

MR. TAN:

I just think you'll more

So first thing that she indicated is that

22

they were just driving around as opposed to anything else in

23

regards to, like, trying to commit a crime, she basically

24

states they were just driving around.

25

Mr. Young returned a few minutes later.

She also says that
Again, about really
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1
2

indicating that he's commit any type of crimes.
At the same time, though, knowing that most likely he

3

did commit some type of break-in.

4

the most incriminating part is where she says that when they

5

were at the 7-Eleven, Steve Young handed her a plastic bag

6

containing some prescription pills, which she discarded, which

7

I think basically in regards to Sub A, so contrary to

8

declarant's proprietary and [inaudible] interests.

9

also Sub B is supported by corroborating circumstance that

10

And then finally, I think

And I think

[inaudible] trustworthiness.

11

I think we have evidence to show that the

12

prescription pills were found in one of the trash cans at the

13

7-Eleven, which Detective Olson is about to testify, but has

14

not testified to yet, so I think it also goes to show his

15

trustworthiness in that respect.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. BAUTISTA:

Mr. Bautista?
I don't believe that we are just

18

driving around as a statement against interest, there's nothing

19

incriminatory with that.

20

exited the vehicle and returned a few minutes later is -- is a

21

statement against interest either, and I don't believe those

22

need any exception.

23

not of subjecting someone to criminal penalty in and of

24

themselves.

25

I don't believe saying that Steve

Their observations or they're -- they're

Stopped at 7-Eleven, and Steve handed her a plastic
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1

bag containing some orange pills which she discarded.

2

with that she told officers she believed the pills were the

3

homeowners', might suggest some incriminating statement there.

4

The question is:

Coupled

That's incriminating for her

5

obstructing, and it's incriminating for Steve, but is that

6

admissible against Mr. Salazar?

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BAUTISTA:

9

THE COURT:

10

think both sides have agreed.

11

under Rule 804(b)3.

12

still alive, she's likely going to be prosecuted based on those

13

statements.

14

car -- who went into the house, he goes into a house, exits,

15

later comes back, and the other evidence that corroborates that

16

is there are things from this particular owner's house in their

17

car, including pills with -- that Mr. Combs' wife's name on

18

them that -- that Steve Young later asked her to dispose of the

19

pills, she does dispose of the pills, and it's corroborated by

20

her walking over to a garbage can, at least a video of what

21

appears to be her walking to a garbage can, and she thought the

22

pills belonged to the homeowner.

23

Okay.

Anything else?

No.

You know, she is clearly unavailable, I
I do find it meets the exception

Because I could see her -- if she were

Driving around with a person who went into the

Well, she apparently had possession of them.

And the

24

pills themselves that were retrieved, I assume the evidence is

25

they were retrieved -- retrieved from the trash can, show her
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1

name on them, and so I see that as being a statement that a

2

reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made

3

only if they believed them to be true, because when made, it

4

was so contrary to their interest as to expose them to criminal

5

liability, and they supported by corroborating circumstances

6

that clearly indicated it's trustworthiness, and it is offered

7

in criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to

8

criminal liability.

9

All of those facts would be put into a case with the

10

same type of charges in this case, plus a charge of obstruction

11

of justice for throwing away the pills.

12

corroborated by both the video of the surveillance camera and

13

by the statements that the officer said the defendant made in

14

this case about Steve Young going into a house and coming out.

15

So I find it meets that exception under 804(b)3A.

16

Anything else for the State?

17

MR. TAN:

18

MR. BAUTISTA:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. BAUTISTA:

21
22

Plus, it's -- it's

Defense?

No.
All of it.

Yeah, I see all of it, because I -Because driving around is not

incriminatory.
THE COURT:

No.

Well, I think it is, when -- when

23

put with the other facts of the case that they were together in

24

the car driving around.

25

MR. BAUTISTA:

How do we overcome confrontation
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1

clause because he's not -- the State's now using this evidence

2

by another person against him, without him having a right to

3

cross-examine that person.

4

issues where we're now having a codefendant's statements

5

without that individual being subject to cross-examination.

6

think Bruton does not allow this.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. TAN:

9

And also I think we have Bruton

What's your response to that?

I think your argument would be if she was

here, she -- we would be with a subpoena and she would be able

10

to testify, whether consistently with these statements or

11

inconsistently, but the fact is:

12

here, she's -- she's dead, which I think we all agreed upon,

13

but it's -- and so I agree.

14

THE COURT:

15

she's passed away.

16

MR. TAN:

17

She's -- she's no longer

Well, I don't we have any evidence of why

Do we?
And my understanding, this is, I think from

what her --

18

MR. BAUTISTA:

19

MR. TAN:

20

MR. BAUTISTA:

We --

-- AP&P agent -I don't think we have evidence; we

21

just know that she passed away.

22

THE COURT:

I -- I kind of assume, given her history,

23

that it was some kind of drug overdose.

24

but I don't know.

25

I

MR. BAUTISTA:

That's what I assume,

I think it's a safe assumption, but
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1

unfortunately --

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. BAUTISTA:

4
5

We -- we don't have --- the long history of that, could

have been a heart attack.
THE COURT:

Right.

Which could have been one of the

6

side effects using drugs.

7

believe the standard is for the confrontation clause issue?

8

MR. TAN:

Anything -- so what -- what do you

Well, I think if the individual was

9

available, and either side can have a -- have him or her come

10

into court and one side or the other doesn't do it, I think we

11

have a confrontation clause issue.

12

fact that the person is deceased, it's sort of like similar to

13

a -- a homicide case kind of, where the victim's dead.

14

obviously, you can't confront someone who's -- you really can't

15

confront someone who's already dead in the homicide, because

16

that leads to somewhat argument in regards to this situation

17

where I think that there isn't any dispute, she's not available

18

because she's hiding, she refuses to cooperate.

19

and sadly she's not available because she's passed away.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. BAUTISTA:

But when it's clearly the

You

Unfortunately

Response, Mr. Bautista?
I think that confrontation clause,

22

both for the Utah state and the federal confrontation clause,

23

trump any rules of evidence.

24

witnesses to test their veracity.

25

corroborated such as the pills being discarded in the trash,

He has a right to cross-examine
Some of these statements are
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1

but the just driving around, and, right now, Steve exited the

2

vehicle and returned a few minutes later, I mean, I guess

3

that's corroborated by the defendant's statement, but the just

4

driving around could be alluded as some kind of criminal

5

wrongdoing.

6

and point out, What do you mean by just driving?"

7

a vague enough statement that it could be prejudicial to the

8

defense, and I think without having her to cross-examine, it's

9

unfortunate that she's passed, but we have the confron -- we

10

have those clauses for a purpose, so that we can test people

11

and -- and with her not being here, he's being denied that, and

12

I do think that without her being here to testify that it's a

13

Bruton issue as well.

We didn't have an opportunity to cross-examine her

14

MR. TAN:

15

THE COURT:

16

And I --

MR. TAN:

18

THE COURT:

20

And what -- talk to me about what you

believe the Bruton standard is --

17

19

It's -- it's

Well, I guess --- and how it applies or doesn't apply in

this case.
MR. TAN:

I don't think it applies, and the other

21

thing I want to add is:

In regards to the confrontation

22

clause, I think part of that can remedied by the fact that, as

23

I understand it, the defense intends on calling Steve Young.

24

The other -- the third conspirator, and he can either validate

25

or invalidate some of the statements that is referenced from
DETECTIVE DAMIEN OLSON - Direct by MR. TAN

00443

190

1

what Nikki Salazar said.

2

unavailable.

3

So it's not like she's completely

And the fact is, again, I would emphasis that she's

4

unavailable because she's -- she's -- she's dead.

I -- I think

5

that some of these issues that Mr. Bautista's concerned about

6

in regards to the confrontation clause, I think some of that

7

can come in through either the direct or cross-examination of

8

Steve Young, as far as him handing her the bag of prescription

9

pills and telling her to discard it.

So I think we -- we're

10

doing our best to -- to not violate Mr. Salazar's con --

11

constitution -- or the confrontation clause, when we can't

12

bring Nikki Salazar back to life and have her testify, but we

13

do have Steve Young, which the defense has subpoenaed.

14

I don't know what their strategy might be, but it might be

15

to -- to anticipate that this might be an issue, and he can

16

testify as to whether or not he told Nikki Salazar to discard

17

the drugs at the scene.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. BAUTISTA:

Which,

Reply?
I don't know if we're allowed to

20

corroborate the State's theory by the defense witness, that

21

sounds burden shifting-ish.

22

that she's unavailable trumps the confrontation clause.

23

lastly, her statements are incriminating herself and they're

24

incriminating Mr. Young, but they're -- how are they

25

incriminating the defendant.

But it's -- I don't think the fact
And

And if they're not incriminating
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1

the defendant are they relevant.
THE COURT:

2
3

But they're -- he's being charged as a

party to the offense.
MR. BAUTISTA:

4

They have to show the actual evidence

5

not just circumstance evidence.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. BAUTISTA:

8

MR. TAN:

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything else?

No.

Not from the State.
Well, the witness is clearly dead, we've

10

stipulated to that.

As to each of the items that she's

11

testifying to, we have -- we have evidence from at least based

12

upon your opening, you've proffered that he saw the car driving

13

around.

14

witness, and that witness is --

Mr. Bautista will have a chance to cross-examine that

15

MR. TAN:

16

THE COURT:

Musgrove.
-- Mr. Musgrove.

If the defendant chose

17

to testify he could get up and confront that statement and we

18

also have Steve Young being subpoenaed by the defense.

19

really as to the Steve Young exiting the car and coming back,

20

the -- in the home, coming back a few minutes later,

21

Steve -- the defendant or Steve Young could respond and respond

22

to that statement.

23

And

As to Steve Young heard -- asked her to impose of the

24

pills, the defendant if he had -- if he chose to testify could

25

seek to rebut that statement to say he didn't hear it, or Steve
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1

Young could say, "No, I didn't ever ask her to dispose of the

2

pills."

3

appears to be on the video and that she thinks the pills belong

4

to the homeowner, they have the homeowner's name on them, and

5

not Steve Young's name on them.

6

As of her disposing of the pills, we have, that

And so I see in the confrontation issue, we can't

7

bring the witness back from the dead, but the defense does have

8

the ability to call the other two witnesses, if it chooses to

9

confront those statements.

10

And so based upon satisfying Rule 804(b)3, and based

11

on the fact that there are other witnesses who could be

12

confronted about those particular facts, I'm going to overrule

13

that objection and admit that evidence.

14

Why don't we just take about a five-minute recess and

15

then we'll continue.

16

here --

17

MR. TAN:

18

THE COURT:

Do you want to see if Mr. Musgrove is

Yes, I'm going to check right now.
And I assume we will start with him and

19

inform the jury of that.

And is there any objection to taking

20

Mr. Musgrove out of turn?

21

away, I don't think you were recorded, but I made my ruling

22

that under 804(b)3A and B, there's an exception to the hearsay

23

rule to allow those statements to come in, and I'm ruling that

24

the confrontation clause issues raised by the defense, I'm

25

overruling those for the reasons I just stated on the record.

I apologize.

Once you start walking
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1

And both sides have stipulated to take Mr. Musgrove out of

2

order, in fact, in the middle of the detective's direct

3

examination; is that correct?

4

MR. TAN:

5

might defer to Mr. Bautista.

6

think he just wants to be in and out as soon as possible,

7

however -THE COURT:

8
9

And, Your Honor, either way is fine, I -- I
I can talk to Mr. Musgrove.

I

How long do you think the direct will

take of the detective?
MR. TAN:

10

I think we're just going to ask the

11

detective about Nikki's statements and then I would turn the

12

time over to Mr. Bautista for cross-examination, and I think

13

we're okay then putting Mr. Musgrove on after the

14

detective's-THE COURT:

15
16

That's my preference.

Why don't you go

talk to him, take five minutes and reconvene.

17

MR. TAN:

18

(Break taken.)

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

So are we ready to proceed?

Is

20

Mr. Musgrove good with finishing this witness before he is

21

called?

22

MR. TAN:

Yes, Your Honor, I had a chance to talk to

23

Mr. Musgrove, I indicated to him that I am almost done with my

24

direct examination of Detective Olson.

25

preference would be to allow defense counsel get a chance to

I indicated that the
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1

THE COURT:

2

changes -- those instructions?

3

MR. TAN:

4

THE COURT:

Mr. Tan, do you stipulate to those

Yes, Your Honor, I do.
Okay.

So we've essentially finalized the

5

post-evidence instructions.

6

break and court will be in recess.

7

MR. BAUTISTA:

8
9
10

So I'll print them out during the

And may I have the benefit of the

record in regard -THE COURT:

Oh, of course.

MR. BAUTISTA:

Your Honor, during our bench

11

conference and whether -- and the discussions of whether to

12

introduce Nikki Salazar's hearsay statements.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. BAUTISTA:

15

THE COURT:

16
17

Uh-huh.
We --

I want to make clear, we were recorded,

this recorded it during that break.
MR. BAUTISTA:

Right.

I made reference to Crawford

18

and Bruton, and I sa -- I said summarily, but I believe the

19

Court was aware that I was making reference to Crawford versus

20

Washington, which was a case that came out to reemphasize the

21

emphasis of the confrontation clause and also Bruton versus

22

United States, which had to deal with codefendant's hearsay

23

statements being used without the benefit of cross-examination.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. BAUTISTA:

Right.
That's all.
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ADDENDUM B

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: November 08, 2017
At the direction of:
01:38:02 PM
/s/ KEITH KELLY
District Court Judge
by
/s/ NAKIA NUUSILA
District Court Clerk
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EDDIE A SALAZAR,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

:
:
:
:
:
:

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
Case No: 171901573 FS
Judge:
KEITH KELLY
Date:
November 8, 2017

______________________________________________________________________________________
PRESENT
Clerk:
nakian
Prosecutor: TAN, PATRICK S
Defendant Present
The defendant is in the custody of the Salt Lake County Jail
Defendant's Attorney(s): BAUTISTA, RUDY J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 8, 1974
Sheriff Office#: 191501
Audio
Tape Number:
S35
Tape Count: 113-24

CHARGES
1. BURGLARY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/30/2017 Guilty
2. THEFT - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/30/2017 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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______________________________________________________________________________________

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)
Credit is granted for time served.
Credit is granted for 7 day(s) previously served.
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
To run concurrent.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1
Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00
Charge # 2

Fine: $1000.00
Suspended: $1000.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$11000.00
$11000.00
$0
$0
Plus Interest

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole.
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail.

Usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation and Parole.
Violate no laws.
Enter into and successfully complete the CATS Program.
Enter into and successfully complete the CATS Aftercare Program.
Obtain a substance abuse evaluation and successfully complete any recommended
treatment.
Defendant to enter into a DORA assessment and enter into and successfully complete any
recommended treatment.
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Defendant is to be screened by AP&P's Treatment and Resource Center (TRC) and complete
any recommended programming/treatment as directed.
Comply with all standard drug and alcohol conditions imposed by probation agency.
Do not use, consume, or possess alcohol or illegal drugs; nor associate with any
persons using, possessing or consuming alcohol or illegal drugs.
Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise distributed
illegally.
Submit to drug testing.
Submit to breath and/or urine testing for drugs or alcohol upon the request of any law
enforcement officer.
No spice, ivory wave or items of the nature.
Submit to random UA's and/or ETG testing.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Not to possess alcohol nor frequent places where alcohol is the chief item of sale.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 171901573 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

ADC ADC-court1@slco.org
APP UDC-CTServices-Reg3@utah.gov

11/08/2017
Date: ____________________

/s/ NAKIA NUUSILA
______________________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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ADDENDUM C

U.S. Const. amend VI

Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.

ADDENDUM D

Utah R. Evid. 804
Rule 804. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay – When the
Declarant is Unavailable as a Witness
(a) Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be unavailable
as a witness if the declarant:
(1) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant’s
statement because the court rules that a privilege applies;
(2) refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so;
(3) testifies to not remembering the subject matter;
(4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a thenexisting infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness; or
(5) is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement’s proponent has not
been able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure the declarant’s
attendance.
But this subdivision (a) does not apply if the statement’s proponent procured or
wrongfully caused the declarant’s unavailability as a witness in order to prevent
the declarant from attending or testifying.
(b) The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony that:
(A) was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given
during the current proceeding or a different one; and
(B) is now offered against a party who had — or, in a civil case, whose
predecessor in interest had — an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by
direct, cross-, or redirect examination.
(2) Statement Under the Belief of Imminent Death. In a civil or criminal case, a
statement made by the declarant while believing the declarant’s death to be
imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith.
(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement that:

(A) a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have made only if the
person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the
declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to
invalidate the declarant’s claim against someone else or to expose the declarant
to civil or criminal liability; and
(B) is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its
trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the
declarant to criminal liability.
(4) Statement of Personal or Family History. A statement about:
(A) the declarant’s own birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce,
relationship by blood or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history,
even though the declarant had no way of acquiring personal knowledge about
that fact; or
(B) another person concerning any of these facts, as well as death, if the
declarant was related to the person by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so
intimately associated with the person’s family that the declarant’s information is
likely to be accurate.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. – The language of this rule has been amended as
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood
and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These
changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result
in any ruling on evidence admissibility.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Subdivision (a) is comparable to Rule 63(7), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Rule
62(7)[(e)], Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), seems to be encompassed in Rule
804(a)(5). Subdivision (a)(5) is a modification of the federal rule which permits
judicial discretion to be applied in determining unavailability of a witness.
Subdivision (b)(1) is comparable to Rule 63(3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971),
but the former rule is broader to the extent that it did not limit the admission of
the testimony to a situation where the party to the action had the interest and
opportunity to develop the testimony. Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah
1980); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981).

Subdivision (b)(2) is comparable to Rule 63(5), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971),
but the former rule was not limited to declarations concerning the cause or
circumstances of the impending death nor did it limit dying declarations in
criminal prosecutions to homicide cases. The rule has been modified by making it
applicable to any civil or criminal proceeding, subject to the qualification that the
judge finds the statement to have been made in good faith.
Subdivision (b)(3) is comparable to Rule 63(10), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971),
though it does not extend merely to social interests.
Subdivision (b)(4) is similar to Rule 63(24), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (b)(5) had no counterpart in Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).

